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MAPLE • PAFOREWORD
The President's Conference on Unemployment which met in Washing-
ton in September, 1921, was called primarily to consider relief for four to
five million unemployed resulting from the business slump of 1921.
During the formulation, of emergency measures, which subsequently
proved successful in greatly alleviating the situation, the responsible
business men, labor leaders, and economists of the Conference ad-
vanced the proposal that an exhaustive investigation should be made of
the whole problem of unemployment and of methods of stabilizing
business and industry so as to prevent the vast waves of suffering which
result from the valleys in the so-called business cycle.
It was the view of the Conference that certain suggestions for con-
trolling extremes of the business cycle so as to lessen the losses due to
recurrent periods of unemployment were worthy of serious consideration
and that in any event a thorough study of the business phenomena of
booms and slumps would serve to advance public knowledge and stimu-
late thought toward constructive solution.Accordingly I appointed
the following committee to undertake an investigation and report:
Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Board, General ElectricCo., Chairman; Joseph
H. Defrees, Former President, U. S. Chamber of Commerce; Mary Van Kleeck, Rus-
sell Sage Foundation; Matthew Woll, Vice-president, American Federation of Labor;
Clarence M. Woolley, President, American Radiator Co.; Edward Eyre Hunt, Secre-
tary of the President's Conference on Unemployment, Secretary.
An exhaustive investigation was undertaken with the assistance of
appropriations toward its cost from the Carnegie Foundation and with
services contributed to the Committee by the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, the Russell Sage Foundation, the Federated American
Engineering Societies, the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, the American
Federation of Labor, the American Statistical Association, the American
Economic Association, the Bureau of Railway Economics, the Depart-
ment of Commerce, and a number of others.
The Committee has prepared the following short report after con-
sideration of the facts and views developed.1 am confident that it
represents a definite advance in economic thought and offers practical
constructive suggestions that should make for progress.A special
volume will be issued at an early date, giving an exhaustive presentation
of the facts and causes in relation to the business cycle and the views
developed as to prevention and remedy.
Vvi FOREWORD
Broadly, the business cycle is a constant recurrence of irregularly
separated booms and slumps.The general conclusion of the Committee
is that as the slumps are in the main due to the wastes, extravagance,
speculation, inflation, over-expansion, and inefficiency in production
developed during the booms, the strategic point of attack, therefore, is
the reduction of these evils, mainly through the provision for such current
economic information as will show the signs of danger, and its more general
understanding and use by producers, distributors, and banks, inducing
more constructive and safer policies.Furthermore, the Committee has
developed some constructive suggestions as to the deferment of public
work and construction work of large public-service corporations to
periods of depression and unemployment, which, while in the nature of
relief from evils already created, would tend both by their subtraction
from production at the peak of the boom and addition of production in
the valley of depression toward more even progress of business itself.
The report does not suggest panaceas or economic revolution but
seeks to drive home the facts that the enlargement of judgment in indivi-
dual business men as to the trend of business and consequent widened
vision as to approaching dangers will greatly contribute to stability, and
that the necessary information upon which such judgments can be based
must be systematically recruited and distributed.
The investigation shows that many firms have pursued such policies
and have come through the recent period of business disaster with success
and stability, and that ignorance of determinable facts accounts for the
disasters to many others.
The whole problem belongs to a vast category of issues which we must
as a nation confront in the elimination of waste if we are to maintain and
increase our high standards of living.No waste is greater than unem-
ployment; no suffering is keener or more fraught with despair than that
due to inability by those who wish to work to get jobs.
The public is indeed indebted to the Committee and to the very large
group of its co-workers for the conduct of so able an investigation and
the production of so much constructive thought. A constant feeling
of the great human problem involved pervades the report and is in itself
a tribute to the highest thought of American business.
HERBERT HOOVER.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 1, 1923.CONTENT S
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QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED
dan unemployment which results from recurrent business depression
be reduced or prevented?Which of the proposals to relieve unemploy-
ment seem to offer prospects of practical service?What groups in the
community can most effectively act? -
Thesequestions were forced upon the attention of the President's
Conference on Unemployment when it met under Secretary Hoover's
Chairmanship in Washington in September, 1921.Millions of wage-
earners were out of work.The first responsibility of the Conference was
to urge upon local communities plans to diminish suffering, but through-
out the discussions it was clear that back of widespread unemployment
were fundamental conditions which must be studied if more effective
action were to be taken in the future than in the past.The depression
of 1921 was obviously to some extent an aftermath of the great World
War, but the War was not solely responsible.We were then in the midst
of one of those periods of depression which inevitably follows abnormal
activity.This upward and downward swing of business, recurring at
intervals in the past century, has become known as the business cycle.
Before adjourning, the President's Conference on Unemployment
provided for the appointment of a Committee to consider the underlying
causes of recurrent depressions and specifically to analyze and present
the more promising proposals for alleviating the extremes of the business
cycle and reducing unemployment.To make this inquiry, Secretary
Herbert Hoover, as Chairman of the Conference, appointed the Com-
mittee on Unemployment and Business Cycles.(See page xxxi.)
General business is now on the upward swing of the cycle, and un-
employment has been greatly reduced. When business again declines
men will be laid off and the problem of unemployment may again become
serious.It will then be too late for any measures except relief for the
unemployed unless we now address ourselves to the task of preventing,
or at least reducing, these extreme fluctuations of business activity.
Prevention as contrasted with relief is possible only through foresight.
The Committee on Unemployment and Business Cycles here presents
to the public a preliminary discussion of the subject.
The Committee has been impressed with the scarcity of sound statis-
tical and economic data regarding this fundamental problem.Extensive
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investigations andwidespreadpublic interest will undoubtedly be neces-
sary before the business community will be able to deal adequately with
the extremes of alternating booms and depressions.The Committee is
confident that the destructive extremes of business cycles can in large
measure be controlled.
If this report stimulates research and experiment by the various
economic groups of this country in an effort to reduce periodic fluctua-
tions in business and arouses them to cooperate with the Department
of Commerce, the Department of Labor, and other agencies in the collec-
tion and distribution of any information they may require the Committee
will feel that its work has been successful.Little in the way of definite
and constructive programs can be advanced until the fundamental facts
upon which action must be based are available in current and comparable
form.
We hope that business organizations, banking associations, labor
organizations, trade associations, and chambers of commerce, as well as
individual business men and bankers, will consider and report back to us
in detail upon these various proposals.(See page xxxii.)
Unless business men, bankers, and other economic groups at once
begin investigation and study of these problems, leading to practical
programs of action, solution will probably be attempted in ways unsound
and unscientific.
WHAT IS THE BUSINESS CYCLE?
The Committee uses the term "business cycle" to describe the series
of changes in business conditions which are characterized by an upward
movement toward a boom, followed by a downward movement into
depression.
Business men know that the term "business cycle" is too simple to
describe accurately the complexity of the problems involved.In reality
the name covers a long series of influences in which a more or less unknown
part is played by the individual establishment, by the industry of which
it is a part, by conditions in other industries, and by credit conditions
and policies,
In thus defining the cycle we are eliminating from consideration
seasonal changes in particular trades or the total fluctuations which they
produce.It is necessary to limit the scope of this report, and for that
reason we hope that the seasonal problems will be the subject of study
by other groups.
For a similar reason we have not been able to report on the problems
of distribution, marketing, and finance in their relation to land owner-
ship and agriculture.
Although a variety of reasons have been assigned for the upward and
downward movement of business which appears to have occurred atREPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xiii
intervals in all industrial countries, the general opinion is that the
influences which cause the business cycle are conditions within business
itself, and that the most productive results in controlling it are likely
to be obtained from a consideration of business rather than from efforts
to explore remote considerations.
Analyses of past cycles of business show certain common tendencies.
If we begin the analysis when business is reviving, in general the charac-
teristic features are increased volume of manufacturing, rising stock
exchange prices followed by rising commodity prices, then by business
expansion and increased demand for credit from both business men and
speculators.As the, result of the advance of commodity prices, money
rates stiffen and credit gradually becomes strained, and these conditions
maybe accompanied by a curtailment of credit for speculative purposes.
Then stock exchange prices fall; for a while longer general business con-
tinues to increase unevenly, transportation facilities are overburdened
and deliveries are delayed, the apparent shortage of goods is intensified
by speculative buying and duplication of orders by merchants and other
buyers until credit expansion nears its limit.Public confidence is then
èhaken, resulting in widespread cancellation of orders if the cycle is
extreme.This is always followed by liquidation of inventories and
sharp and irregular fall of prices.During the period of depression there
is always more or less widespread unemployment.
The cycle which ended in the depression of 1921 was unusual both in
the extent of the preceding expansion, in the severity of the depression,
and in the amount of unemployment.For this reason it is significant
for us to review some examples of business difficulties caused by the last
great fluctuation of business.
A BUSINESS PROBLEM
In December, 1919, two manufacturers of silk went to their bank.
One as a result of his study of business conditions—the degrees of over-
expansion, inflation, and speculation—had decided that prosperity was
beginning to assume the aspect of an unsafe boom.Although business
was brisk and sales heavy, he told his bank that he did not propose to
stock up during this period but that he would attempt to sell his goods
with as rapid a turnover as possible.
The other manufacturer asked the bank for a large loan.Orders had
been coming from his customers larger than those of any previous season,
trade papers were emphasizing the scarcity of raw silk, traffic congestion
made it seem imperative to increase his inventories, and he believed
that it was necessary to expand in order to maintain his relative position
in his trade.The bank gave him the loan because all the customary tests,
such as the "two-to-one ratio" of quick assets to liabilities, usually
relied upon to justify such an of credit, were met.Almostxiv REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
immediately the tide of prosperity turned in the silk industry, as the first
manufacturer had predicted, and there came a severe drop in prices of
both raw material and finished product.The second manufacturer
found his factories stocked with high-priced raw material and with
goods produced in the belief that good times and high prices would
continue.The reduced value of his inventories made him unable to
liquidate his loan, and his business was virtually bankrupt.
Was it wholly a defect in judgment upon the part of the second busi-
ness man for which he alone was responsible?Did the bank use proper
judgment?Did it have a responsibility which it did not exercise?
In the silk industry wholesale prices continued to rise until about
February, 1920.Wholesalers and retailers talked of the great demand
for silk and the great shortage of raw goods in the country.The men
in the silk industry honestly believed that there was a lack of raw silk
and that prices would continue to rise.The extent of the accumulation
of speculative stocks was not realized in the trade.It was not until
insurance companies discovered that the amount of silk which they had
collectively insured was beyond their insurance limits that anyone
understood that there was really an excess supply of silk in storage.
Reacting to this news, all prices of silk dropped at once, and manu-
facturers, wholesalers, and retailers found themselves with huge inven-
tories to liquidate.Manufacturers and wholesalers suffered from a
general cancellation of orders, which still further added to their difficulties.
While the silk industry is peculiar in that most of the raw materials
are imported, it shows the general developments leading to a depression
market.It furnishes a striking example of the lack of information on
the part of men within an industry as to the amount of stock in storage
and the amount of stock in transit (which always increases during periods
of business expansion), and, finally, of failure to take into consideration
the great amount of speculative buying.The Committee finds that this
lack of information is characteristic. in the silk industry
couldinthisrespect be duplicated in a large number ofother
industries.
It was not only manufacturers of silk who were faced with these prob-
lems in the early stages of the last business boom.In the autumn of
1919 the merchandise manager of a department store in New England
began to make plans for the spring trade in one of his important hues.
He knew the prices of raw and finished goods had been advancing steadily,
and retailers had encountered difficulties in securing prompt deliveries.
He was convinced that he must place his orders well in advance of his
needs.His store, like that of other retailers, had sold an unprecedented
amount of goods.Trade rumors appeared to indicate that the supply
of raw materials was less than normal, and it was so difficult to secure
deliveries that retailers duplicated orders with different manufacturers
in order to be assured of the delivery of part of theirREPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xv
The merchandise manager thus decided to place in the autumn an
order for the full requirements of the anticipated spring trade in 1920,
for the purpose of avoiding the loss of prestige which the store would face
if it were unable to supply its customers.To finance its purchases the
company negotiated a bank loan at a time when money rates were rising,
when wholesale and retail prices of all commodities were tending upward,
and when the rapid advance—although the manager did not know this
fact—had led to a good deal of speculation in the goods he wished to buy.
The loan was obtained, the order given, and the result, of course, was a
heavy loss.
It should here be pointed out that the retailer must carry stocks on
hand.He must expect to take some losses in a period of depression.
Some retailers believe that it is wise to build up a reserve in a rising
market, fixing prices on a replacement value; they believe that it is good
business to take losses early in a falling market by the same process of
determining prices by replacement values.If information were pro-
vided to enable the retailer to change his present habits and buy "from
hand to mouth" at the top of the boom and in larger quantities in a
period of depression, bank credits would be relieved and cancellations
decreased.It is the natural tendency at present to overstock in boom
times and to stop buying in a depression.This tendency is strengthened
by the difficulty of obtaining deliveries in a period of boom.
Early in 1920 a manufacturer of pulp and writing paper contracted to
buy a large supply of pulp wood in order that the company's own exten-
sive timber lands might be reserved for later use.The large sums
expended for this purpose were listed as assets on the balance sheet of the
company.For the first half of 1920 the company did the largest business
•.n its history.Early in the following autumn cancellations began to
Dour in, and orders for spring delivery declined 50 per cent.Despite the
'act that the company seemed to be efficiently organized and had stand-
its products it was thrown into bankruptcy because of this error
.n judgment which caused it to accumulate raw materials at the peak
)f the cycle.
The object of giving so much space in this brief preliminary report to
the difficulties of the business men is, first, to show by these cases the
:omplexity of the problem of business cycles and, second, to emphasize
,he intricate decisions which confront business managers in their daily
ictivities.
It might be said that our examples prove, in the ease of the manu-
acturers of silk goods at least, that it was the conservative manager who
;ucceeded and that the second manager, in seeking larger profits, took
rnwarranted speculative risks which resulted in failure.This is by no
neans universally true.The following instance of two manufacturers
the shoe industry illustrates the difference between what may bexvi REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
readily recognized as a conservative policy in one period of the business
cycle and what just as clearly becomes a speculative policy in the other
extreme of the cycle.
The first manufacturer of shoes, well along in the period of expansion,
received more than pormal orders from his customers.He knew the
industry was overexpanded but he lacked any basis for judging how to
handle his business at this time.Supplies of leather were apparently
very small; congested railroad conditions made it imperative to have his
raw material shipped to him several weeks before it was usually
prices of leather were rapidly rising.The men in the industry did not
question the price at which leather could be purchased but seemed willing
to pay any price for raw material laid down at the factory.Under these
conditions the manufacturer followed what must have seemed to him a
conservative policy by purchasing raw material enough to cover his
orders.Then came the break in leather prices; cancellations poured in,
and he was unable to liquidate and experienced an enormous loss on
his inventory of raw material.
Another manufacturer, under the same market conditions and at the
same stage of the business cycle, convinced himself through a study of
conditions that his orders were inflated and that it would be unwise to
cover with raw material.He cut his orders to 25 per cent of his require-
ments.Other executives in his plant and particularly his sales organiza-
tion opposed this policy.They prophesied not only that he would
have to cover at high prices hut that he would probably not be able to
secure raw material at all and consequently his relative position in the
industry would be destroyed.After the break this shoe manufacturei
was able to purchase raw material to fill his requirements at much reduced
prices, and he was able to send his sales organization into the field with a
line of shoes produced at low cost, in competition with his competitors
who were attempting to liquidate high-priced inventories.
It was not because one of these managers was conservative that he
was more successful in coping with the problem of cyclical losses.The
distinction which the Committee would emphasize is that the managei
who knew and acted with reference to the fundamental facts of the rela-
tionship of his particular business to his industry and who had a sound
knowledge of general business conditions from study of statistical data oi
trade generally was able, to a large extent, through policies planned in
1919 and 1920, to avoid the difficulties of 1921, while the manager who
ran his business without reference to such factors was gambling in his
most important decisions.
Another reason for reviewing these examples is to bring out the
differences among industries in their relation to the general busines5
cycle.The instances cited are interesting because the collapse of sith
prices came before the depression in the shoe industry, and both cairnREPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xvii
before the slump in paper.It is also of interest to point out that the
drop in silk prices was one of the first signs of the general business
depression and that paper was one of the last commodities to feel its
full effects.The study of trends of our industries should thus become
a safeguard.
In dealing with these problems the banks are in a position of great
importance.The banks should realize sooner than the typical manu-
facturer when credit strain is approaching and should be in a position to
warn their customers of impending danger.One of thedifficulties
which makes the banks in this respect less effective than they should be is
the competitive situation.The individual borrower never likes to be
told by his bank that his request for a loan is not granted, and if his
credit standing is high the bank is apt to allow doubtful loans because it
fears the loss of the customer's good will and his business through
refusing them.This difficulty can be avoided only by placing proper
research information in the hands of the bank in such form that the bank
may use it with its customers without danger of losing business.The
banks must realize that the responsibility for the overexpansion of loans
rests upon them rather than upon their borrowers.Expansion of bank
credit is a necessary condition of• expansion of business operations.
When the resources of the banks reach an end, a sudden contraction of
loans is always a factor—generally the most compelling factor—in
bringing about a business collapse.To meet the varying needs of
modern business, credit must be elastic.There should be provisions for
expansion as well as contraction.But an overexpansion of credit may
so increase the purchasing power of business men that it will merely
result in enabling them to bid against one another for limited supplies
of goods and material so as to force prices above what consumers are
willing and able to pay.Bank credit often expands so rapidly that it
lifts the buying or investment power of business men out of line with the
general buying power of the community.Because of their strategic
position the banks have an unusual duty and an exceptional opportunity
to give sound information and counsel tobusiness men.
A problem which business men faced in 1920 and 1921 was the wide-
uncertainty caused by cancellation of orders.From one stand-
point these cancellations were entirely unjustifiable.Legally the orders
constituted contracts and should have been carried out.It is important,
however, to consider why widespread cancellations occurred.Their
extent was undoubtedly due to at least two causes, both intensified by the
wide fluctuations in that particular cycle.
First, in the period of inflation of 1919 to 1920 an unusual and perhaps
unprecedented delay in securing deliveries was caused by the breakdown
of transportation facilities near the peak of the boom. Many business
men not only placed orders earlier than usual but also duplicated them,xviii REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
or ordered in larger quantities, with the expectation of having deliveries
scaled down.When the slump came they had strong temptations to
cancel.
Second, price levels had been on such a high plane when orders were
placed and the fall in prices was so violent that many business men faced
the alternative of cancellation or bankruptcy.Under these conditions
it was wiser for the seller to accept cancellation than to deliver material
to a customer who could not pay.
These two circumstances account for the fact that cancellations played
such an extraordinary part in this cycle.There is reason to believe that
in mild swings of the cycle, when inflation does not bring about such
excessive commitments and when drops in prices are less drastic, cancel-
lations are less important.The problem, however, should receive the
earnest consideration of business men and their associations.
Contracts for purchase of materials should contain definite and sub-
stantial financial penalties for cancellation.It is clearly undesirable
that contracts should be considered subject to cancellation except under
conditions specified in advance, with such penalties as may be fair to
both parties.Insistence on this principle and the inclusion in con-
tracts of substantial penalties for cancellation will tend to prevent dupli-
cation of orders, to lessen the tendency to place orders far ahead of
immediate requirements, and to prevent speculative buying by men who
when they order have no intention of completing the purchase if prices
drop.
THE NEED FOR FACTS
From the illustrations of business experience which we have reviewed
it is evident that knowledge of one's own business should be strengthened
by knowledge of the conditions in the industry of which it is a part, and
by information about current and future trends in general business con-
ditions.The business man is placed thereby in a strong position to
exercise judgment based on facts rather than on guesses, speculations,
or approximations.
First, he must have available for his use current facts about general
business conditions throughout the country and knowledge of the proba-
ble future trend of general business conditions.
Second, he thust have the basic facts about his industry.Because
his particular business is influenced by conditions affecting his entire
industry, he must be in a position, with others in his industry, to study
its peculiar industrial problems.
Third, he must secure enough facts about his own business to give him
not merely statistics but a proper basis for judgment. as to his general
policies.
Fourth, he must inform himself in regard to the general credit situation
and especially the attitude of his own bank toward extensions of loans.REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xix
METHODS OF CONTROLLING THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Any consideration of methods to control the business cycle naturally
divides itself into two parts—first, methods of preventing excessive ex-
pansion, such as occurred in the year 1919 and 1920, and second, methods
of reducing the extent of the decline and of alleviating the distress
caused by the depression.To a considerable extent these two are con-
nected and interrelated.Anything which controls expansion tends also
to lessen depression.Extreme expansion leads business men to dangerous
over-extension, which is followed by collapse, whereas more moderate
swings of the cycle stop short of this dangerous condition, with the result
that more business men are able to maintain their business in a condi-
tion fundamentally sound.In cycles where this is typical the recovery
of business is much more rapid.
The problem which the Committee has been asked to analyze is the
possible prevention of widespread unemployment through the control of
extreme fluctuations of the business cycle.The suggested remedies
that have been included in the analysis made by the Committee
relate both to the direct prevention of expansion or inflation and to the
prevention of unemployment.In the order of their discussion these
proposed remedies are:
Control of credit expansion by banks generally.
Possible control of inflation by the Federal Reserve System.
Control by individual business men of the expansion of their own
industries.
Control of public and private construction, including construction by
public utilities, at or near the peak of the business cycle.
Construction of public works in the depression.
Unemployment reserve funds.
Federal and State employment bureaus.
We are not here including a discussion of programs for relief of the
unemployed and their families through social and charitable organiza-
tions and other agencies of the community charged with the prevention
of distress, not because we underrate the importance of such programs,
but because programs of relief of the poverty due to unemployment are
not within the scope of this investigation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION I
Collection of Fundamental Data.—Obviously the primary point for
assembling data bearing upon trends of business is in each separate
establishment.Many• business organizations to day maintain intimate
and complete statistics as to their production, stocks, orders, consump-
tion, employment, and other pertinent questions not only as of the presentxx REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
but in comparison with former periods.If, however, business men are
to have the data necessary to form a judgment as to the trend of produc-
tion and consumption in their own industries, and in other industries
purchasing from them or selling to them, and to evaluate special
influences that may affect productivity or consumption in business as a
whole, they must be willing to contribute, summaries of the data of their
individual units to some common fund of information.
The first requisite in seeking such data is to assure the individual that
the detailed facts about his business will not be divulged, except as these
facts are included in a general total drawn from several sources.The
second important point is that only the essential facts in simplest possible
form are required.
In many industries the cooperation necessary to form a common pool
of fundamental facts is made possible through trade associations to which
current figures are reported by their members.In other industries
such figures in whole or in part are supplied directly to Government
bureaus.Some of these statistical services have existed over many
years and have become incorporated into the daily business life of the
country.They are not, however, sufficiently extensive to answer all
needs.
In an endeavor to put in more available form the sum of information
now current, and to add to it, Secretary Hoover has established in the
Department of Commerce a monthly SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSI-
NESS which summarizes the data available from all sources that bear
upon this major problem of business trends.This survey comprises not
only the information collected directly by the Department of Commerce,
but also the crucial facts collected by othd Government bureaus and the
material brought together through cooperation within trade associations.
To a considerable degree the survey of current business has now covered
the range of industry.It is essential that the service should be main-
tained and expanded.
The greater part of the material presented by the Department of
Commerce is based upon data furnished voluntarily either by industries
or by trade associations.One of the difficulties in making such returns
effective for their purpose is the refusal of a few firms to contribute to the
common pool through either of these channels.Such refusal destroys
the possibility of common knowledge in certain industries and seriously
undermines the ability of business men in such industries to form proper
judgments.It also decreases the area of knowledge of the currents of
business as a whole necessary to each separate business.
The vast majority of business men have given enlightened cooperation
in these efforts.But the minority who refuse to cooperate are doing
injury to the business fabric as a whole.Reluctance to reveal facts to
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suppliedto the Department of Commerce are protected by special
statute and are not available in their individual form for any other
purpose either of the Government or of business.
It happens that information which is regarded by many students of
the business cycle as most important is conspicuously lacking, namely, the
actual stocks of different commodities on hand, whether in the place of
manufacture or in transit, or in wholesale or retail warehouses.The
practical use of such information may be illustrated if the experience of
1920 and 1921 be recalled.Early in 1920 the prevailing impression was
that available goods were inadequate, and that orders must be placed
far ahead to insure deliveries.In the summer of 1921, on the other hand,
it was commonly believed that the goods on hand exceeded the consumer's
demand.All of the facts, however, indicate that early in 1920 there was
an excessive supply of goods, a condition which led shortly to collapse,
while in the summer of 1921 stocks were very low and the resulting spread
between stocks produced and consumers' demand inevitably brought
about the current upward turn in the business cycle.
What is evidently needed is an increase in the resources of the Depart-
ment of Commerce and a larger degree of cooperation with the Depart-
ment in coordinating and extending business information, so that business
men and bankers may know promptly the facts about the rate of pro-
duction measured in physical units, the stocks on hand and in transit, the
trend of prices, the volume of sales, and the trend in money rates.There
is great need also for recording data as to the speed of freight movements
so as to show whether the output of farms and factories is being promptly
distributed to the consumer or is being delayed in transit because of
freight congestion.Such congestion results in stimulating and duplicat-
ing orders and increasing inventories.Reliable information as to the
extent of these delays would be very significant.It is important to
emphasize the need of prdmptness in publishing statistical data and the
fact that the failure of individual business units to make prompt returns
delays the whole.
Of the various data needed, statistics of employment are highly
important and are being collected with increasing efficiency by the federal
Bureau of Labor Statistics.Conditions in business are invariably
reflected in the volume of employment.Employment statistics reflect
the economic welfare of wage-earners and are information of the greatest
social importance.
When the Conference on Unemployment met in Washington in 1921
the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics was collecting monthly from a
limited number of industries data as to the total number on pay-rolls
each month and the total wages paid, which indicate whether industries
are carrying their normal forces of employees or whether men are being
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reports through the State Department of Labor, which was collecting
identical facts extensive enough to chart the course of employment in the
state.Duplication was thus avoided and only one report was required of
any industrial plant, while both state and nation got the benefit of the
information.The same plan has been in effect in Wisconsin since 1920.
Recently Illinois and Massachusetts have arranged for the same sort of
cooperation with the federal bureau.Once the plan has been launched
in New York, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Massachusetts business men wel-
come the information and make reports promptly.Other states should
now cooperate and the resources of the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics
should be made sufficient for adequate work.
RECOMMENDATION II
Larger Statistical Service.—The Committee recommends the expan-
sion and standardization of the statistics now collected by state and
federal bureaus, the publication of employment statistics by the federal
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the final summation and publication
of all of these statistics by the Department of Commerce, in order that
there may be promptly available a connected, uniform series of facts
about the trend of business.It is important that agreements should be
reached as to uniform definitions of terms and simplification of the
material.Representatives of the various industries should aid Govern-
ment bureaus in working out the questions to be asked and in securing
the cooperation of their respective industries in establishing the habit of
regular, prompt, and accurate reporting.It is the consensus of opinion
of those who have most experience in the use of these periodical statistics
that they should be as simple as possible and published promptly after
they are collected.
With the exhaustive Census of Manufactures made by the Depart-
ment of Commerce in five-year instead of two-year periods, it is possiNe
annually to collect intermediate statistics of sufficient reliability by samp-
ling methods, basing the ratio upon the five-year determinations, and to
issue these figures promptly.Beyond this, monthly statistics of the
same items are vital, although they need not be so exhaustive.
Expedition in publication is highly important, and while with the.
present limited resources of the Government departments and trade
associations it is impossible to collect otherwise than by mail, it would be
of the greatest possible value to business and commerce if the results of
certain key industries could be collected by telegraph and published
within the first ten days of each month; these to be followed by the more
ample statistics collected by mail and relating to a larger spread and
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In collecting figures on stocks and production the following list of
commodities has been suggested to the Committee by experts as
significant in showing the trend of the business cycle.Statistics of
these commodities should be collected through a telegraphic service and
should be issued immediately, as stated above.Later they should be
published with more ample data in monthly publications, together with
the statistics of many other industries which, bear indirectly upon the
question, all being finally related to the one-year and five-year periods.
The list follows:
Raw wool and woolen textiles.
Raw cotton and cotton textiles.
Hides and leather and shoes.
Iron and steel and leading fabricated products, such as structural
steel and standard tools.
Zinc, lead, and copper and leading products of each.
Bituminous coal.
The collection and dissemination of statistics must be current, periodic,
and in comparable form for many industries.They should be uniform
and continuous, and they should be collected officially, since complete
data rather than samples are necessary, and no private organization
could have the authority to secure without interruption this basic infor-
mation.Moreover, uniformity is important, and hence it is desirable
not to have the work scattered through several organizations.
RECOMMENDATiON III
R.esearch.—A primary necessity is the collection and dissemination
of fundamental data.Following this, we need further development of
special research into economic forces, into business currents, and into
broad questions of economic method.Industries generally recognize
the need of research in physical science.Laboratories have been
equipped with large staffs of trained workers.A similar recognition of
the importance of economic research and the interpretation of economic
facts would be the beginning of better control of business conditions by
business men.
Although more constructive and thorough research should be iarried
on by individual companies with reference to their own individual busi-
ness and to the industry of which they are a part, and more extensive
research information should be disseminated by the Government, there
is need for investigations by financially disinterested and impartial
research organizations through whose work the individual manager can
"check" the results presented to him by his own research department.
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science have already appreciated the need for outside impartial investiga-
tion of the same problems that are being studied within their own
laboratories.
The business fraternity should recognize the value of such work and
encourage both outside organizations and universities to go further in
the investigation of economic subjects.
The forecasting of probable business trends is difficult and can never
be undertaken successfully by any kind of public institution, except in a
limited field.Business men must themselves form their own funda-
mental judgments when adequate data are furnished.Research as to
the effect of different trends and economic forces is, however, a different
problem from forecasting.Such research should be carried on continu-
ously by the Government bureaus, because the data available to these
bureaus are more extensive than those available to other institutions,
which must depend upon published summaries of Government data.
RECOMMENDATION IV
Control of Credit Expansion by Banks.—The individuals banker, like
the individual business man, may properly be asked to aliume some
measure of responsibility.If only in his own interest, his policies should
be determined by the general business situation as well as by the apparent
soundness of the particular transactions his customers ask him to finance.
The solvency of his customers is inextricably bound up with that of other
business firms.The soundness of their transactions often depends upon
whether or not the expansion of business is outrunning the purchasing
power of consumers.To guide his policies the banker, like the business
man, needs access to a large fund of knowledge about the general trend
of business activities, and because he is a specialist in finance the banker
has a peculiar obligation to give sound advice to his customers.One
suggestionis that when prices are rising and business is expanding
bankers should ask borrowers to maintain an increasing ratio of quick
assets to current liabilities.
Before the establishment of the. Federal Reserve System the banks
often expanded their loans until their reserves were reduced to a danger-
ous point.Forced then to curtail credit drastically, their action had
made more severe the reaction following a period of prosperity.It is
generally recognized that in 1920 the resources of the Federal Reserve
System enabled the banks to. carry their customers through a difficult
period and thus very likely prevented a panic.Much would have
been gained if more of the banks had warned their customers of the
impending financial stress.
The individual banks can render another service in the depression.
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extraordinary extent during the period of falling prices.But borrowing
by individual banks from the Federal Reserve Banks during the last
depression was new to the banks of this country, and many such banks
had an uncomfortable feeling of inefficiency and weakness until their
loans at the Reserve Banks were reduced to small amounts or were
entirelyeliminated.In many specificinstancesthis undoubtedly
resulted in their bringing pressure on customers to liquidate loans as
early in the period of recovery as such liquidation was possible.And
while in some ways liquidation was helpful, undoubtedly it sometimes
resulted in complete or practically complete liquidation of businesses
which with a little more time could have regained their feet.Fortu-
nately a reasonably liberal policy in the depression stage of the last cycle
was the general practice on the part of banks and of the Reserve System.
RECOMMENDATION V
Possible Control of Inflation by the Federal Reserve System.—A
close parallel is usually observable between the cycle of business and the
cycle of credit.While the relationship between the volume of credit and
the volume of business and the movement of prices is not always simple
to interpret it appears to be sufficiently close to make it a matter of first
importance that the volume and the flow of credit should at all times be
tested by the contribution which additions to the volume of credit make
to the, total of economic production.Additions to credits which cannot
be economically validated by a commensurate effect in actual production
are speculative, and as such should be subjected to control, so that
business and industry can be maintained in a healthy state.Such con-
trol is primarily the responsibility of the banker and secondarily of our
agencies of banking supervision.
Credit conditions are of major importance in the upward movement of
the cycle and in precipitating the decline, so that the first and most
important method of controlling the cycle and preventing excessive
expansion should be found in the fundamenta]s of our banking situation.
Control of expansion so that production is allowed to increase and busi-
ness is actively stimulated to a proper degree, while expansion is checked
at the stage when it becomes dangerous, is a fundamental principle
already accepted by bankers.
The only automatic check upon the expansion of bank loans in a
period of prosperity is the requirement of the law that the banks shall
always maintain a certain specified minimum legal reserve against their
current liabilities.But there should be an additional limitation due to
the banker's own realization of his responsibility to the community in
the issuanceof additionalcredits.Thisisparticularly important
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upon the banker can be rendered ineffective through the replenishment
of his reserve by borrowing from Federal Reserve Banks.
With the Federal Reserve as the chief agency for the supply of credit
beyond the ordinary supply of the banks of the community, the problem
requires wise and sagacious administration on the part of the Federal
Reserve System, so that this most important function of the Federal
Reserve System can be effectively performed.From the point of view of
the economic welfare of the country the Federal Reserve authorities should
be given every encouragement and support in the administration of the
credit facilities of the System.
The Federal Reserve Banks now hold, as a result of the War, a much
larger amount of gold than would suffice to support all of the credit
which American industry and agriculture can possibly need on anything
like present price levels.Much of this gold we are holding only tem-
porarily—virtually as trustees for the world.With the return of more
prosperous conditions in Europe a considerable part of this gold will
naturally leave us.Meanwhile this excess gold might become the basis
of a disastrous inflation of our domestic credit, which would be followed
by an even more disastrous collapse when the gold goes out.lit has been
suggested that the Federal Reserve System should, if possible, set aside or
earmark as a special reserve against future foreign demands that portion
of their gold holdings which is considered by them now in excess of the
proportion of the world's gold which this country should normally be
expected to hold.Although it is important that credit should be avail-
able at the time of a crisis, it is also important for the general public to
realize that the expansion of credit in times of "prosperity" should be
guarded by the voluntary action of business men cautioned and advised
by bankers, to the end that may be preserved and not
destroyed by inflation, which in due course must precipitate depression
and deflation, with their inevitable consequences of social and eco-
nomic distress.
Our banking system represents a common pool of both investment and
commercial capital, and for that reason the devices of European systems
for the control of speculation are not applicable here to the same extent
as they are abroad.A finer distinction between the two broad groups is
desirable but is largely impracticable in the United States.The subject,
however, warrants research and study.In any event the determination
of the time when business passes from the area of economically legitimate
hazard to the area of economically illegitimate hazard or when the proper
use of capital for the expansion of production passes into the improper
use for the pyramiding of prices requires a large development of economic
statistical information and agencies for its interpretation.
In a government such as ours the most difficult question to solve from
the very beginning has been how to centralize in individuals sufficientREPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xxvii
power to enable the Government machinery to function wisely and
promptly and at the same time to impose such restraints and balances as
to guard against autocratic or arbitrary exercise of such power.This is
the problem which faces us in the development of the Federal Reserve
System to its maximum usefulness, and it is a problem worthy of most
careful and thorough study by bankers and associations of bankers.
RECOMMENDATION VI
Control by Business Men of the Expansion of Their Own Industries.—
The Committee has seen numerous instances in which the individual
business man, by conducting his business with reference to the business
cycle, has avoided dangerous overextension of inventories and fixed capi-
tat which in many other instances resulted in unemployment and business
failure during the cycle just past.It therefore believes that while the
individual cannot in any large way influence the general situation or
entirely avoid the losses incurred in periods of depression he can in
most cases by foresight keep his business fundamentally sound.*
Few subjects in recent years have attracted more attention from busi-
ness men than the stabilization of business operations.Various devices
have been employed with varying success.Many of these have been
ineffective because of failure to base the plans upon the fundamental
fact that business policies should be determined with full recognition of
their relation to the business cycle.
Planning production in advance and with reference to the business
cycle, laying out extensions of plant and equipment ahead of immediate
requirements with the object of carrying them out in periods of depres-
sion and carrying through such construction plans during periods of
low prices in conformity with the long-time trend, the accumulation of
financial reserves in prosperity in order to mark down inventories at the
peak, and the maintenance of a long view of business problems rather
than a short view will enable firms to make headway toward stabilization.
The firm which approaches a period of business depression in the
strongest financial condition is most likely to be able to give its workers
steady employment.
RECOMMENDATION VII
Control of Private and Public Construction at the Peak.—One
method by which periods of expansion might in part be controlled is
through the cessation and postponement of construction by the Govern-
ment, railroads, public utilities, and private owners in boom periods when
prices are high.Cessation or postponement of construction work is
,obviously wise in any such period and will tend to level the cycle.
*Sofar as construction is concerned, this topic is treated in the next section in
connection with similar governmental projects.xxviii REPORT AND RECOMMENDAT.TONS
Individual business men and corporations should consider the business
cycle far more than they do in planning their construction work.The
results for the farsighted firms that exercise this type of business judg-
ment are most satisfactory.Reserves built up in periods of high earn-
ings and expansion are then spent for construction during periods of
depression.When this policy is more generally followed it will be of
peculiar value, as it will tend to keep low the ratio of fixed investment
to productive capacity, to the great advantage of industry.
There are difficulties, however, in the way of a widespread extension
of this practice on the part of business men.In the first place, the tax
situation even now naturally tends to make companies extravagant in
maintenance charges in good times.Moreover, the business man whose
business has developed to a point where the demand for his finished prod-
uct is in excess of his capacity to produce is always beset by the argu-
ments of his sales organization desiring to see plant capacity balanced with
apparent selling capacity, and on the other hand by the arguments of the
salesmen of construction companies who, like his own salesmen, assure
him that construction costs in future will inevitably be higher than they
are at present.While it is desirable, therefore, to postpone as many types
of permanent construction work as possible until periods of depression,
the real hope that this can be accomplished as a matter of wide policy is
dependent on the possession by business men of data showing funda-
mental conditions with reference to periodic fluctuations.
Systematic accumulation of reserves by business men in times of pros-
perity for use in plant expansion and improvement in times of depression
would, if widely adopted, be an excellent method of controlling the crest
of the boom and ameliorating the depression.It has the advantage
that it is a method which any business man may adopt to his individual
advantage.
Holding back public works and private construction for periods of
depression not only gives employment to large numbers of workers when
it is most needed but creates a demand for raw materials for construction
which in turn stimulates other industries to offer employment.It main-
tains the buying power of those directly or indirectly employed, it creates
a market for goods, and it enables the workers directly or indirectly
employed to buy. the products of other industries.Finally, construction
work in a period of industrial depression, when costs are lower, is
economical.
The essential steps in any general program are to plan construction
work, private or public, long in advance with reference to the cyclical
movement of business, and in the case of public works to pass the neces-
sary legislative appropriations when facts about the trend of business
show that it is sound policy to spend money for such purposes.
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to be undertaken in periods when private industry is active, so that more
work might be done during periods when private industry is slack, the
Government would not compete with private industry to so great an
extent in times of prosperity and thus would not be a factor in the inflation
of money rates, prices of materials, and employment.
The Committee calls attention to the need for careful drafting of laws
to insure a policy of reserving public works projects, if this is to be done
effectively.The need for fixing the responsibility for the preparation of
such plans in advance, the importance of securing the release of the pro-
jects at the right time by legislation, and the provisions for financing
should be considered with special relation to the obstacles, legal and
others, which the particular public authority would have to overcome.
While the difficulties are great, everything which can be accomplished
in this way is valuable.
RECOMMENDATION VIII
Public Utilities.—The controlling factors in the management of
public utilities and railroads differ obviously from private business,
because of Government regulation of earnings and rates.So far as
railroads and public utilities are concerned, both are likely to find their
net earnings reduced in a period of high prices and high wages.This
tends naturally to bring about a construction policy similar to the one
which we have recommended above.
With reduced earnings and the high interest rates which are customary
at the peak of inflation, the natural tendency of public utilitiesto
postpone improvements until net earnings are better and interest rates
are lower.This is typically true in periods of low general prices.
In the interest both of the utilities and of the buying public it is
obvious that the normal time to finance new construction or improve-
ments in public utilities is in periods of depression, when interest charges
are reasonable and costs of construction low, but the delays encountered
at such times in obtaining the necessary authorizations by public regulat-
ing bodies may in many cases be such that the favorable money market is
lost.This is a problem to be studied by public-service commissions and
similar bodies, which can by prompt action meet this difficulty.
In so far as the managers of utilities and public-service commissioners
can regulate construction in order to fill up the valleys and lower the
peaks of the business cycle, they will aid in alleviating the extremes of the
cycle, and by means of their economies.they will keep their capital invest-
ment from unnecessary expansion, to the advantage both of the utilities
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RECOMMENDATION IX
Unemployment Reserve Funds.—Nothing is more demoralizing for
wage-earners than the feeling of insecurity of employment.Unemploy-
ment and the fear of unemployment are powerful causes of discontent.
Wage-earning men and women must meet responsibilitiesfor the
support of themselves and their families wholly from their earnings.
Loss of employment not only eliminates income but lessens the ability
of wage-earning men and women and their families to make purchases,
thus intensifying the period of depression.
To provide reserve funds or savings during periods of prosperity from
which the worker may draw during periods of compulsory unemployment
is one of the important methods advocated as tending toward relieving
the fluctuations of business.Such plans of cooperative provision for
relief against unemployment are not primarily designed to decrease the
amount of unemployment but to alleviate its evil effects.
The idea of employer, employee, or both contributing during periods
of employment to a reserve fund under separate or joint control to help
sustain the worker when unemployed in periods of depression, and to
equalize and stabilize his purchasing capacity, merits consideration.It
attacks one of the most vital of our industrial problems.The establish-
ment of funds by the employer or by associated workers to take care of
foreseen or unforeseen contingencies has proved advantageous in the past.
Neither reserves against decline of inventory value set up by manu-
facturers nor unemployment benefits of trade unions are new things to
American industrial life.The principle may well be extended.
In considering the principle upon which unemployment reserves
should be based, the Committee finds that American experience with
cooperative unemployment reserve funds is very scanty.The experi-
mentation which has been carried on in this country is confined largely
to trade unions and to the individual efforts of a few firms.
Experiments here and abroad in this important field serve principally
to suggest interesting questions for discussion.Certain inherent diffi-
culties immediately become apparent; one of them, as the Committee
has already pointed out, is the lack of essential data to determine the
amount of unemployment, not to mention the unemployment specifically
due to the business cycle.Among the plans considered or tried are
various forms of unemployment reserve funds Organized by individual
companies for their workers, or by whole industries for the entire group
of workers engaged in them, or by groups of workers, or state or nation.
Each has obvious difficulties.
Because of the large expense involved it appears fundamental to the
success of such experiments that cyclical unemployment be reduced to its
minimum before aay general relief measures are attempted.Moreover,REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xxxi
effective plans for accumulating general funds against periods of cyclical
unemployment require large-scale organization and the solution of many
complex problems of administration.On these accounts the Committee
feels that it must wait upon the experience to be gained from varied
experimentation in the organization of such plans before attempting to
recommend a definite program.
The Committee cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of
preventing undue expansion of the business cycle as brought out in
earlier sections of this report, and this will also add to the possibility of
securing a sound actuarial basis for unemployment reserves.
RECOMMENDATION X
Employment Bureaus.—A national system of employment bureaus
was recommended by the President's Conference on Unemployment, and
the Committee gives hearty approval to that recommendation. We
do not regard an employment service as having a direct and immediate
effect upon the business cycle.We do believe that if such employ-
ment bureaus are organized throughout the country their reports will
show the demand for labor and the number of workers seeking positions
and will therefore be another measure of business conditions.If em-
ployment bureaus are organized effectively enough to insure transfer
from one position to another with the least possible loss of time, they
will make labor more immediately available and thus prevent loss of
production for the employer and loss of income for the wage-earners,
thus helping to maintain the level of purchasing power.It is obvious
that any measure which tends to maintain the level of purchasing power
tends to stability in business.
In conclusion the Committee would reiterate its conviction that unless
business men, bankers, and others who are responsible for policies and
practices in industry begin without delay to study and to act in order
to meet the problems of unemployment and business cycles, solutions
which may prove to be fundamentally unsound will be attempted
the benefit of practical experience.No problem before the business
world today offers a more inspiring challenge to sound industrial
leadership.
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
By way of the main problems which the Committee has
had under consideration the following general questions are set forth
for discussion and comment by such groups as may desire to cooperate
with the Committee in a program of study and experiment.
1. To Business Men (includingall managers of industries and
wholesale and retail distributors):
Would you regard as practicable and effective for your industry the
program suggested by the Committee, including more comprehensive
periodic statistics of employment and business conditions; a more ade-
quate plan of research, possibly developed by each industry as a whole in
cooperation with universities or other research agencies; revision of bank-
ing practice to conform to business policies gradually built up on the basis
of more facts developed through research; a cooperative plan throughout
the industry for unemployment reserve funds; and the development of a
nation-wide system of public employment bureaus?What other sta-
tistics do you require in the conduct of your business and from what
other industries should they be secured to be of most value to you?
What problems for economic research or special study is your industry
concerned with?
What would you add to this outline and how would you modify it?
What facilities for putting it into effect already exist in your own in-
dustry? What obstacles do you see in carrying it out, and how could
they be removed?
2. To Bankers:
To what extent can the business cycle be affected or its consequences
averted by bankers? How far is the possibility of action by bankers
dependent upon a change in laws, and how far is it dependent upon the
individual action of bankers upon the basis of a sound interpretation of
statistics?
3. To Managers of Public Utilities and Public Service Commissioners:
To what extent can public utilities now plan their operations so as to
finance construction when costs are low and resist the demands for
extension when costs are high? What would be the effect of such a policy
upon rates, and how can the obstacles in the way of carrying it out be
removed?
4. To Wage-Earners:
Would the bad effects of unemployment be lessened by unemploy-
ment reserve funds? How can such reserve funds be best established?
How are such funds best administered? Do you favor a nation-wide
system of employment bureaus, and how can the public employment
bureaus best serve the workers in your trade?REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xxxiii
5. To Engineers:
To what extent can improvements in methods of production and
organization of marketing in each industry relieve the business cycle?
What are the difficulties now in the way of making these improvements
and how can the difficulties be removed?
6. To Citizens' Organizations:
How can the influence of citizens be most effectively enlisted in back-
ing the proposed program for the establishment of more adequate sta-
tistical services in state and federal bureaus and the planning and timing
of public works; in support of policies in public utilities which will
influence the business cycle; in encouraging the cooperative action of
industries to provide unemployment reserve funds and in supporting per-
missive legislation for this purpose if it be necessary; in support of bankers,
wage-earners, and business men in their efforts to adopt a sounder policy?
NOTE ON THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH
The first act of the Committee after its appointment by Secretary
Hoover was to ask the National Bureau of Economic Research to map
out an investigation which would formulate present experience with
unemployment and business cycles and so would assist the Committee
in beginning its inquiry into these complex subjects.But the Com-
mittee desires to point out that it is in no way responsible as a Com-
mittee for the findings in the Bureau's report and that, in accordance
with provisions in the Bureau's constitution, that organization in turn
does not make itself responsible for the statements and recommendations
of this Committee.
The report of the National Bureau of Economic Research is intended
to furnish the Committee on Unemployment and Business Cycles and
the public which the Committee seeks to interest, a statement showing—
1. Such explanations concerning the nature of business cycles and
the fluctuations in employment as are necessary for understanding the
problem.
2. The character and bearing of the leading devices which have been
tried or proposed for mitigating unemployment through control over the
fluctuations of business activity.
3. The conditions which must be considered in judging the probable
effectiveness of these devices.
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MADE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCHPREFATORY NOTE
"Business Cycles and Unemployment" is a special investigation made
under the direction of the National Bureau of Economic Research.It
was undertaken under circumstances of peculiar urgency which are
explained in the Introduction, and which differentiate it rather sharply
from the normal type of work which the Bureau is undertaking to do.
But the general procedure established in the By-laws of the Bureau has
been followed, in that the manuscript of each chapter has been submitted
to the Directors for their approval.Many changes in the text have been
made as a result of their suggestions and constructive criticisms.Such
criticisms and remarks as it was found impossible to incorporate in the
text are shown in footnotes.
Two general comments by directors are appended:
I have not been able to read nearly all of the manuscript, but have looked it over
in a cursory way and read a good deal.I think the work is well conceived and well
done, and will be a valuable contribution to the subject.
GEORGE E. ROBERTS,
As one of the directors of the National Bureau of Economic Research 1 approve
the publication of the report on "Business Cycles and Unemployment" as it has
been submitted to me in manuscript, in common with other directors of the Bureau.
I feel constrained, however, to append a note to the effect that the study of conditions
and events that has been made does not give adequate attention to fundamental
economic motivations that are beyond control.I refer to such things as broad
national enterprises that may prove to be mistakes, to deep rooted and widely extend-
ing alterations in the conditions of production and consumption, to general wars, and
to changes in social conditions.
In illustration of my meaning I cite too premature building of railways in the West
of the United States, the greatly increased production of silver by fortuitous discovery
and improvements in the arts of mining and metallurgy that led eventually to the
demonetization of silver, the Great War of 1914—18withits consequential economic
dislocations spreading all' over the world, and the social disturbances and changes
which confront us now.It is important not to confuse ordinary business cycles with
the irregular undulations following some great upheaval of such nature.
The Great War of 1914—18 produced an economic cataclysm that enmeshed
almost every human being in the civilized world.There will be no dissent from the
statement•that the world has not yet passed out of its shadow.It seems to me to be
highly dangerous to convey any impression that the United States in 1921 simply
passed through the depression of an ordinary business cycle.
WALTER R. INOALLS.
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